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Abstract 
This study analyzes the trading effects of FIFA World Cup in two 
dimensions. First, focusing on the host countries’ trade and estimating both static 
OLS and dynamic panel estimations, we show that participating in the World Cup 
significantly increases exports from the participant countries to the host countries, 
relative to a control group of non-participants. We also obtain the same pattern for 
the exports originating from the host countries to the participants. Second, we 
demonstrate that trade is reasonably higher for host-participant pairs compared to 
other country pairs both in the years of the World Cup and permanently over the 
sample of our data. We offer a number of plausible arguments and important 
channels for our findings.   
 
JEL Classification: F19, L83 
Keywords: trade, export, import, World Cup, large sports events, host, participant 
                                                          
†
 For helpful discussions, we thank: Kishore Dhavala, Sheng Guo, Cem Karayalcin, Dmitry 
Krichevskiy, Mohamed Nasseredine and Mehmet Ulubasoglu.  
 
‡
 Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, FL, 33199.  
  E-mail:vavsar@fiu.edu. Tel:305-348-2316 
 
§
 Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami,FL, 33199.  
  E-mail:umut.unal@fiu.edu. Tel:305-348-2316 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
At the 2004 conference of the joint Turkish and Korean business council, Park 
Won-jin, the chairman of the Korean-Turkish Business Council, stressed the 
importance of the 2002 World Cup in Korea on the swelling of bilateral trade between 
the two countries. It was Turkey’s first World Cup appearance since 1948 and they 
won the bronze medal after an entertaining victory over Korea. Shortly thereafter, 
bilateral trade between these countries leapt to a sum of one billion dollars, which 
represents a 20-percent increase from the previous year. There was another 32-percent 
increase, with bilateral trade reaching more than 1.3 billion dollars in 2004. Is the 
argument raised by Park Won-jin historically relevant? Does the World Cup promote 
trade between the host and participant countries? To our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to address this question empirically.  
The World Cup is the most widely followed mega-sport event in the world. 
Unlike the Olympic Games, national teams face a tough competition in order to 
qualify for the tournament, which produces a single winner in a single sport. As 
opposed to the one-month period of the actual tournament, the qualification stage 
takes two years and a total of approximately 200 nations compete in around 800 
games to qualify for the 32 spots in the tournament.
1
 Although much lower than the 
cost of hosting the World Cup, national teams still have to spend significant amounts 
of money to qualify for the tournament. Costs include hiring a good manager, scouting 
for alternative players, and improving domestic sports facilities for the preliminary 
games. Countries do not want to miss the world’s soccer feast and wait another four 
years because being in the competition brings a number of benefits to the country. In 
this paper, we investigate one dimension of these benefits, an improved trading 
relationship between the host and participant countries.  
Our empirical results suggest that the World Cup significantly increases the 
exports/imports of the host countries to/from the participant countries relative to non-
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participants and that the host-participant pairs have higher trade with each other 
compared to other country pairs. 
The first plausible argument for our findings is the increase in visibility and 
exposure. Mega sporting events bring important advertising, which increases the 
ability of both the host and the participant countries to influence each other’s 
consumers. One consequence of this influence is that it improves the awareness of 
their products, allowing these countries easier access to each other’s markets.2  
Secondly, the World Cup attracts significant numbers of tourists from the 
participant countries to the host country. Although the main purpose of these travels is 
to attend the games, it can also work as an important mechanism to start, build, and 
improve trading networks for businessmen. In addition, potential visitors might be 
attracted to the venues after the tournament due to their exposure during the games.
3
 
As noted in Poole (2010), international travel helps buyers and sellers transfer 
information about local culture, customs, and markets, creating an efficient business 
relationship.
4
 Therefore, the World Cup can help the host and participant countries to 
attenuate the informational and cultural barriers to trade. 
Although the channels described above can be defined as the major 
mechanisms that explain the trading effects of the World Cup, one can also note other 
arguments. For instance, Rose and Spiegel (2011) point out that the hosting of large 
sporting events can work as a signal for trade liberalization and increase countries’ 
openness significantly. Following the same line of argument, the World Cup can also 
contribute to the negotiations of trade liberalization between the host and participant 
countries.
5
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 See Preuss (2004). 
3
 See Rose and Spiegel (2011). 
4
 There is a growing literature about the effect of international travels on trade. [Including, but not 
limited to, Kulendran and Wilson (2000), Aradhyula and Tronstad (2003), Poole (2010), Christea 
(2011)]. 
5
 Two examples in this category are the formation of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which coincides with the 1994 World Cup, held in the U.S., and Turkey’s entry to the European Free 
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In addition, foreign business organizations in both countries may have easier 
access to policy makers to lobby for lower protection and reduced bureaucracy and 
procedures because of the World Cup. Therefore, larger sports events may also work 
as an important channel to decrease the bilateral trading costs and thus contribute to 
the trade between the host and the participant countries. 
This study fits into the literature that examines the effect of mega sports events 
on economic activity. Generally, the primary focus in this literature is the cost and 
benefits associated with hosting mega sports events. For instance, Hagn and Meannig 
(2008) have demonstrated that the World Cup has almost no effect on the 
unemployment in the match venues, which is in line with the results of a number of 
works, particularly those of Baade and Matheson (2000 and 2001, 2004) and Carlino 
and Coulson (2004). Among these, Baade and Matheson (2001) provide estimates for 
the economic impacts of Major League Baseball (MLB) by examining the data for the 
23 All-Star games during the period of 1973 through 1997. Their analysis reveals that 
All-Star Game cities had employment growth below that which would have been 
expected. On the other hand, Lee and Taylor (2005) show that the 2002 World Cup 
provided major economic benefits to South Korea. According to Plessis and Venter 
(2010), the immediate impact of the World Cup 2010 on the South African economy 
was around 0.1% of the GDP. Similarly, Ahlert (2007) estimates the potential, 
national and regional economic effects on the German economy because it hosted the 
2006 World Cup. His results indicate a positive overall effect on GDP, private 
consumption, and investment.  
Our paper most closely complements the earlier work by Rose and Spiegel 
(2011), which examines the trading effects of hosting the Olympics. Their results 
suggest that trade is over 20 percent higher for the host countries, and unsuccessful 
bids to host the Olympics also have a similar impact on exports. For the first time in 
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the literature, our focus is on the relationship between the host-participant pairs, rather 
than the effect of the large sporting events on the host country itself.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
describe the data. Section 3 includes the empirical specification and the results. 
Section 4 provides a brief conclusion. 
2. Data 
We obtained the trade data and the other country level variables from Rose and 
Spiegel (2011).
6
 For the trade data that is not recorded in their dataset, we utilized the 
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
7
 For the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership, we utilized the WTO website. Finally, the data on the hosts and the 
participants of the World Cup were obtained from the website of FIFA (Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association). 
Our sample includes bilateral observations for the periods between 1950 and 
2006 for 196 countries. Table A1 shows the host countries for each World Cup and the 
corresponding participants.  
3. Empirical Specification 
3.1. Exports to/from the Host Countries : Participants vs. Non-
participants 
Pooled OLS Estimation 
We started our empirical specification by analyzing the effect of the World 
Cup on the trade flows of the participant countries to/from the host countries, relative 
to nonparticipants. To do so, we pooled our bilateral trade data over World Cup host 
and year combinations and employed the “gravity” model of international trade, which 
                                                          
6
See http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm (We appreciate their generosity.)  
7
 Rose and Spiegel (2011)’s data have the export values (Xij) from country i to j. For the export values 
from j to i, we constructed our own data.   
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is extensively used to estimate the bilateral trade flows between paired countries. The 
following equation is estimated by OLS
8
: 
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1 ln(Xijt-1) + β2 ln(popit) + β3 ln(popjt) + β4 ln(GDPpcit) + β5 
ln(GDPpcjt )+ β6 Common Languageij + β7 RTAijt + β8 Common Borderij + β9 Islandsij 
+ β10 WTOijt + β11 Areaij + β12 Colonyij + β13 Landlockedij + β14 ln(Dij) +  θ1 
Participantjt + εijt                        (1) 
where i denotes the World Cup host, j denotes the exporter country, t is the year of the 
tournament, Xijt denotes the exports from j to the host countries, pop denotes 
population, GDPpc is the annual real GDP per capita. Common Language and 
Common Border take a value of 1 if the country pairs share the same language and the 
same land border respectively. Area is the log of the areas of the countries. RTA is a 
binary indicator and is unity if the countries have a regional trade agreement. Island is 
the number of island countries; WTO is the number of WTO members; and 
Landlocked is the number of landlocked countries in the pair. Colony is a binary 
indicator and is equal to 1 if the country pairs have colonial ties. Dij denotes the 
distance between i and j. In addition, we also added the lagged value of the dependent 
variable to capture the effect of historical factors on current trade.
9
 
The variable of interest in (1) is Participantjt, which takes a value of 1 if the 
country j is qualified to the particular World Cup held in country i. Since we pooled 
the data for World Cup host and year combinations, we interpret the coefficient of this 
variable as the increase in the exports of the participant countries to the host countries 
relative to the control group of nonparticipants. 
 Table 1 reports the coefficient estimates obtained from equation (1). Since the 
year dummies control for the invariant host country specific variables when we pool 
the data over World Cup host and year combinations, specifications in Table 3 do not 
                                                          
8
Although hosting the World Cup may be thought as endogenous, participating to the tournament is 
exogenous. Therefore, OLS is not biased. 
9
See Eichengreen & Irwin, 1997;  Bun & Klaassen, 2002; De Grauwe & Skudelny, 2000; 
Vandenbussche & Zanardi, 2010. 
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include the GDP and the population of the host country.
10
 To save space, we do not 
discuss the coefficients of the standard gravity controls as they are not of particular 
interest. Consider the first column in Table 3; the estimate of θ is positive and 
statistically significant. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, participating in the 
World Cup increases exports to the host countries by 17 percent, relative to a control 
group of non-participant countries.
11
 In columns 2 to 6, we carry out a number of 
experiments which were suggested by Rose and Spiegel (2011). For instance, one 
could argue that the results obtained in specification 1 might be particularly driven by 
the trading effects of the World Cup in a specific region. For this consideration, we 
removed the observations where country j is a Latin American Country, an African 
country, and a Middle Eastern Country in specifications 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
Moreover, we also dropped the observations for the poor exporters (those with real 
GDP per capita less than $1000 per annum) in specification 5. Finally, we removed 
the 2.5 standard deviation outlier observations in specification 6. As documented, the 
coefficient θ is still positive and significant although slightly different in magnitude. 
Therefore, our estimates do not result from some small subset of the data.   
 Table 2 reports the estimates when the dependent variable is replaced by 
exports from the host countries to country j and the first right-hand side variable 
becomes its lagged value. Similarly, we obtain a significant coefficient for the 
participant dummy.   
As a result, the World Cup does not only contribute to exports from the 
participating countries to the hosts, but also to exports originating in host countries 
and being exported to participant countries. The World Cup increased the host 
countries’ exports to participant countries by 13 percent when compared to the 
nonparticipant countries. This effect is significant and robust to the set of experiments 
discussed earlier.   
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 In our pooled OLS estimation, year dummies are equivalent to World Cup host dummies.  
11
 We use the formula used by Kennedy (1981) to convert the coefficient of the dummy variable to its 
true marginal effect. 
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 Dynamic Specification (Permanent Effect) 
 We also estimate the effect of the World Cup on the trade flows of participant 
countries to/from the host countries, relative to a control group of nonparticipants 
using panel data. 
 We employ the following specification:   
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1 ln(Xijt-1) + β2 ln(popit) + β3 ln(popjt) + β4 ln(GDPpcit) + β5 ln(GDPpcjt 
)+ β6 WTOijt + β7 RTAijt +  θ2 Participantjt + εijt  + µijt                                      
(2) 
where i denotes the World Cup host, j denotes the exporter country, and µijt denotes 
country-pair fixed effects. There are three differences in this specification when 
compared to equation (1). First, t denotes the time period between 1950 and 2006. 
Second, following Rose and Spiegel (2011), our variable of interest takes on a value of 
1 at or before time t, which is interpreted as the permanent effect of the tournament on 
the trade between host and participant countries. Further, since country-pair fixed 
effects control for all time-invariant factors, we do not include them in (2), as opposed 
to (1). 
 A serious problem in estimating (2) is the serial correlation in the export series 
which would bias the OLS estimates. We therefore apply instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation where the second lag of the dependent variable is used as an instrument.
12
 
To address the concern of weak instruments, we tested the quality of our instrument. 
The F-test obtained in the first stage confirmed the validity of our instrument.
13
     
 The estimation results obtained from equation (2) are reported in Table 3. As 
shown, the dynamic estimation provided smaller estimates for most of the control 
variables as opposed to the static OLS estimation reported in Table 1. In addition, the 
permanent effect of the World Cup on the exports from the participant countries to the 
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 Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010). 
13
 The first stage estimates are reported in Table A2. 
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host countries also decreased as compared to the static estimation, which provided the 
temporary short-run effect. To gauge the economic effect, consider specification (1) in 
Table 2. Countries that qualified to the World Cup finals exported 9 percent higher to 
the host countries, relative to a control group of non-participants. Similar to the earlier 
section, we also check the robustness of our results in the next specifications of Table 
3. As documented, our results are insensitive to all of the robustness checks described 
earlier.   
 In Table 4, we replaced the exports to the host countries with exports from the 
host countries. Again, our estimates suggest that host countries exported more to the 
participant countries than to non-participant countries. The magnitude of the estimates 
is similar to those documented in Table 3.  
3.2. Trading Effects of the World Cup: Host-participant pairs vs. 
Other Countries 
   Pooled OLS Estimation 
 Having analyzed the participant countries’ exports to/from host countries 
relative to a control group of non-participant countries, we turn to the trading effects 
of the World Cup for the host-participant pairs relative to all other country pairs.
14
 
Hence, we pooled the bilateral trade data over World Cup years to estimate the 
following model via OLS: 
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1 ln(Xijt-1) + β2 ln(popit) + β3 ln(popjt) + β4 ln(GDPpcit) + β5 
ln(GDPpcjt ) + β6 WTOijt + β7 RTAijt + θ3 Participantijt + εijt + µijt                                                                 
(3) 
where i denotes the importer and j denotes the exporter, and t denotes the years in 
which there was a World Cup (1950, 54, 58….2006). Participantijt is unity if country j 
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 Note that other country pairs include host countries and non-participants, and participants and non-
hosts. 
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participated in the World Cup organized in country i in year t. µijt denotes country-pair 
fixed effects.
 15
    
We document the estimation results of (3) in Table 5. Table 6 also shows the 
results when the dependent variable is the exports from i to j. Similar to earlier 
estimates, we obtain positive and significant estimates for the variable of interest. 
Economically speaking, in the years of the World Cup, trade is 15-20 percent higher 
for host-participant combinations when compared to other country pairs. Once again, 
removing some subsets of our sample does not alter our findings.          
 Dynamic Specification (Permanent Effect)  
 Our last specification is the panel estimation of the permanent effect of the 
World Cup on the trade flows of host-participant pairs, compared to other country 
pairs. In particular, we estimate the following gravity model:     
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1 ln(Xijt-1) + β2 ln(popit) + β3 ln(popjt) + β4 ln(GDPpcit) + β5 ln(GDPpcjt 
)+ β6 WTOijt + β7 RTAijt +  θ4 Participantijt + εijt  + µijt                                                                     (4)     
where i denotes the importer, j denotes the exporter, and t denotes the years from 1950 
to 2006. As opposed to the previous three specifications, this one includes all country 
pairs and years in the sample. In line with the previous panel estimation, Participantijt 
takes on a value of 1 if the country j participated in the World Cup in country i during 
or prior to year t. We correct the bias associated with the serial correlation of export 
values by applying IV regression. The first stage results suggest that the second lag of 
the dependent variable is a strong instrument for the first lag.
16
    
  Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the estimation results for exports to/from country i 
from/to country j, respectively. The estimates on the coefficient θ4 suggest that host-
participant pairs had 7-11 percent higher trade between each other as compared to 
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 As opposed to the previous pooled estimation in section 3.1, we include the country-pair fixed effects 
in equation (3) due to the higher number of observations that make the estimation feasible with fixed 
effects. 
16
 Table A2 
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other country pairs between 1950 and 2006. This effect is robust to the number of 
robustness checks such as dropping some of the regions and poor countries from the 
sample and removing the outliers.     
4. Conclusion 
The FIFA World Cup attracts media and sponsorship, draws thousands of 
international tourists, and provides important global showcase opportunities for 
countries to improve their visibility and exposure. It also works as a channel for the 
host and the participant countries to reduce the cultural and informational barriers 
between them. Therefore, the World Cup brings many mechanisms to promote trade 
between the host and the participant countries. In this paper, we build on this argument 
and obtain strong evidence of a reasonable trading effect of the World Cup using 
bilateral trade data for 196 countries between 1950 and 2006. We carry out our 
empirical analysis in two dimensions. First, focusing on the host countries’ trade and 
estimating both static OLS and dynamic panel estimations, we show that participating 
in the World Cup significantly increases exports from the participant countries to the 
host countries, relative to a control group of non-participants. We also obtain the same 
pattern for the exports originating from the host countries to the participants. Second, 
we demonstrate that trade is reasonably higher for host-participant pairs compared to 
other country pairs both in the years of the World Cup and permanently over the 
sample of our data. These findings are also important in the sense that most of the 
existing studies have concentrated on the economic effects of hosting large sports 
events. Our study paves the way for detailed works on large sports events and the 
economic, social, and cultural relationships between the host and the participant 
countries.  
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 Table 1. OLS Estimation (Pooled over World Cup Hosts & Years Combinations)  
Dependent variable:  Log of Exports to the host countries 
Participants vs. Non-participants  
   
 All sample (1) Drop Latin 
American 
Countries (2) 
Drop African 
Countries (3) 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries (4) 
Drop Poor 
Countries (5) 
Drop 2.5 
outliers (6) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.863 0.855 0.862 0.862 0.872 0.759 
 (45.07)*** (39.00)*** (38.17)*** (44.31)*** (41.41)*** (27.24)*** 
Participantjt 0.172 0.162 0.181 0.179 0.164 0.158 
 (2.04)** (2.09)** (2.49)** (2.85)** (2.24)** (1.76)* 
WTO member  0.136 0.183 0.042 0.197 0.066 0.141 
 (2.82)** (2.07)** (2.23)** (2.15)** (2.38)** (2.81)** 
Log Distanceij -0.198 -0.193 -0.262 -0.176 -0.150 -0.184 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.95) (0.02) (0.69) (0.10) 
Islands  -0.274 -0.256 -0.366 -0.264 -0.171 -0.221 
 (2.46)** (2.13)** (2.92)*** (2.25)** (1.34) (1.80)* 
Log Populationjt 0.449 0.434 0.457 0.446 0.469 0.457 
 (1.73)* (1.92)* (1.49) (1.72)* (1.71)* (1.86)* 
Log (Real GDP p/c)j 0.365 0.370 0.317 0.370 0.382 0.377 
 (1.66)* (1.73)* (1.75)* (1.71)* (1.97)** (1.66)* 
Landlocked  -0.197 -0.216 -0.244 -0.205 -0.165 -0.248 
 (1.80)* (1.80)* (1.95)* (1.84)* (1.47) (1.97)** 
Common Languageij 0.202 0.192 0.203 0.229 0.289 0.231 
 (1.66)* (1.79)* (1.74)* (1.59) (1.86)* (1.91)* 
RTAij 0.085 0.191 0.011 0.118 0.025 0.060 
 (0.72) (1.36) (0.09) (0.95) (0.21) (0.46) 
Common Borderij 0.480 0.310 0.399 0.498 0.550 0.549 
 (2.00)** (1.89)* (1.85)* (2.04)** (2.22)** (2.18)** 
Log Product Land Areasij -0.011 -0.021 -0.008 -0.018 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.45) (0.74) (0.28) (0.70) (0.02) (0.26) 
Colonyij 0.345 0.317 0.202 0.345 0.515 0.468 
 (1.81)* (1.66)* (0.91) (1.72)* (2.32)** (2.14)** 
Observations 1331 1114 997 1229 1146 1103 
R-squared 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.71 
 Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms included but 
suppressed.             
                   
Table2. OLS Estimation (Pooled over WC Hosts & Years Combinations) 
Dependent variable:  Log Exports from the host country) 
Participants vs. Non Participants 
   
 Full sample Drop Latin 
American 
Countries 
Drop African 
Countries 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries 
Drop Poor 
Countries 
 
outliers 
Lagged dependent variable 0.431 0.414 0.427 0.405 0.421 0.319 
 (11.45)*** (10.26)*** (10.03)*** (10.88)*** (10.81)*** (10.10)*** 
Participantjt 0.145 0.132 0.121 0.131 0.121 0.133 
 (2.37)** (2.62)*** (1.89)* (2.37)** (1.98)** (2.92)*** 
WTO member  0.181 0.147 0.181 0.147 0.184 0.187 
 (1.41) (1.11) (1.33) (1.07) (2.15)** (2.12)** 
Log Distanceij -0.560 -0.645 -0.492 -0.569 -0.562 -0.641 
 (10.66)*** (10.15)*** (9.22)*** (10.75)*** (10.74)*** (6.35)*** 
Islands  0.133 0.169 0.144 0.137 0.148 0.100 
 (1.88)* (2.21)** (1.95)* (1.82)* (2.04)** (0.90) 
Log Populationjt 0.441 0.460 0.462 0.465 0.453 0.245 
 (10.66)*** (9.98)*** (9.61)*** (11.49)*** (10.48)*** (5.03)*** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)j 0.646 0.654 0.752 0.678 0.709 0.363 
 (12.07)*** (11.18)*** (11.58)*** (12.30)*** (12.44)*** (5.72)*** 
Landlocked  -0.498 -0.507 -0.549 -0.484 -0.579 -0.342 
 (5.70)*** (5.36)*** (5.11)*** (5.68)*** (5.88)*** (3.10)*** 
Common Languageij 0.228 0.367 0.229 0.241 0.215 0.269 
 (2.75)*** (3.47)*** (2.28)** (2.77)*** (2.45)** (2.33)** 
RTAij -0.101 -0.195 0.025 -0.124 -0.076 -0.139 
 (1.40) (2.33)** (0.34) (1.62) (1.03) (0.82) 
Common Borderij 0.028 0.021 0.093 0.007 0.009 0.381 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.51) (0.04) (0.05) (0.86) 
Log Product Land Areasij 0.013 0.011 -0.007 0.012 0.016 0.059 
 (0.66) (0.51) (0.36) (0.61) (0.78) (2.00)** 
Colonyij 0.902 0.934 0.863 0.979 0.933 0.704 
 (5.20)*** (4.25)*** (3.73)*** (5.43)*** (4.87)*** (3.43)*** 
Observations 1641 1385 1234 1510 1469 767 
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.56 
Table 3. IV Panel Estimation 
Dependent variable:  Log of Exports to the host countries 
Participants vs. Non-participants 
 All sample Drop Latin 
American 
Countries 
Drop African 
Countries 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries 
Drop Poor 
Countries outliers 
Lagged dependent variable 0.750 0.735 0.750 0.744 0.748 0.565 
 (104.97)*** (86.22)*** (94.89)*** (99.50)*** (99.41)*** (54.34)*** 
Participantjt 0.094 0.082 0.095 0.076 0.078 0.094 
 (3.02)*** (2.51)** (3.43)*** (3.31)*** (3.21)*** (1.80)* 
WTO memberijt 0.035 0.050 0.009 0.057 0.051 0.009 
 (1.22) (1.62) (0.24) (1.84)* (1.62) (0.24) 
Log Populationit 0.651 0.417 0.465 0.426 0.279 0.244 
 (2.08)** (2.10)** (2.57)** (3.57)*** (4.35)*** (3.26)*** 
Log Populationjt 0.250 0.204 0.239 0.231 0.244 0.298 
 (3.04)*** (4.47)*** (3.48)*** (4.29)*** (3.87)*** (1.83)* 
Log (Real GDP p/c)it 0.629 0.556 0.535 0.523 0.529 0.551 
 (2.05)** (1.97)** (2.81)** (2.50)** (2.63)** (2.31)** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)jt 0.422 0.410 0.427 0.411 0.420 0.464 
 (0.84) (0.21) (0.73) (0.41) (0.63) (1.55) 
RTAijt 0.034 0.048 0.020 0.054 0.036 0.022 
 (1.24) (1.50) (0.67) (1.89)* (1.28) (0.68) 
Country pair fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.56 
Observations 63589 53095 46999 58333 57001 44746 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms 
included but suppressed.  
Table 4. IV Panel Estimation 
Dependent variable:  Log Exports from the host countries 
Participants vs. Non-participants 
 All sample Drop Latin 
American 
Countries 
Drop African 
Countries 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries 
Drop Poor 
Countries outliers 
Lagged dependent variable 0.153 0.149 0.159 0.147 0.152 0.140 
 (73.48)*** (66.34)*** (66.43)*** (67.02)*** (69.25)*** (52.41)*** 
Participantjt 0.081 0.088 0.086 0.061 0.060 0.093 
 (4.40)*** (3.55)*** (3.91)*** (2.73)*** (2.80)*** (4.30)*** 
WTO memberijt 0.220 0.228 0.192 0.184 0.207 0.186 
 (15.15)*** (14.43)*** (11.44)*** (12.07)*** (13.38)*** (9.81)*** 
Log Populationit 1.592 1.119 0.636 0.270 1.554 1.575 
 (43.84)*** (25.85)*** (25.73)*** (10.33)*** (42.13)*** (20.83)*** 
Log Populationjt 0.431 0.301 1.505 1.568 0.556 0.644 
 (18.43)*** (11.38)*** (40.30)*** (42.19)*** (23.24)*** (33.53)*** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)it 1.171 1.116 0.829 0.835 1.223 0.893 
 (57.65)*** (47.49)*** (58.79)*** (58.91)*** (55.88)*** (51.51)*** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)jt 0.817 0.809 1.270 1.235 0.840 1.144 
 (64.09)*** (58.06)*** (53.50)*** (62.85)*** (58.42)*** (46.06)*** 
RTAijt 0.327 0.381 0.285 0.351 0.332 0.349 
 (23.90)*** (23.52)*** (20.54)*** (24.88)*** (24.31)*** (20.31)*** 
Country pair fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.57 0.63 0.65 0.53 0.61 0.61 
Observations 82236 69340 61115 75436 73541 50326 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms 
included but suppressed.  
Table 5. OLS Estimation (Pooled over WC years) 
Dependent variable:  Exports to i 
Host- Participant pairs vs. Others 
 All sample Drop Latin 
American 
Countries 
Drop African 
Countries 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries 
Drop Poor 
Countries outliers 
Lagged dependent variable 0.621 0.616 0.621 0.624 0.619 0.463 
 (190.87)*** (174.93)*** (171.07)*** (183.72)*** (181.74)*** (118.99)*** 
Participantijt 0.191 0.204 0.208 0.200 0.199 0.168 
 (2.05)** (2.81)*** (2.24)** (2.10)** (2.14)** (1.79)* 
WTO member 0.004 0.004 0.028 0.003 0.015 0.042 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.81) (0.09) (0.47) (1.18) 
Log Populationit 0.381 0.344 0.312 0.370 0.306 0.363 
 (1.78)* (1.79)* (1.60) (1.76)* (1.74)* (1.71)* 
Log Populationjt 0.172 0.195 0.137 0.161 0.153 0.183 
 (1.29) (1.58) (1.74)* (0.98) (0.90) (0.95) 
Log (Real GDP p/c)it 0.720 0.843 0.839 0.839 0.711 0.819 
 (1.73)* (1.84)* (2.06)** (1.18) (1.20) (1.59) 
Log (Real GDP p/c)jt 0.637 0.509 0.618 0.632 0.646 0.560 
 (2.15)** (2.29)** (2.00)** (2.87)** (2.02)** (2.24)** 
RTAijt 0.016 0.011 0.035 0.005 0.019 0.035 
 (0.59) (0.36) (1.18) (0.17) (0.66) (1.11) 
Country pair fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.25 
Observations 73875 64344 58259 67532 68038 58619 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms 
included but suppressed.  
Table 6. OLS Estimation (Pooled over WC years) 
Dependent variable:  Exports from i 
Host- Participant pairs vs. Others 
 All sample Drop Latin 
American 
Countries 
Drop African 
Countries 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries 
Drop Poor 
Countries outliers 
Lagged dependent variable 0.189 0.186 0.189 0.190 0.188 0.183 
 (114.45)*** (106.40)*** (102.37)*** (108.64)*** (108.82)*** (88.27)*** 
Participantijt 0.180 0.159 0.170 0.152 0.185 0.166 
 (4.32)*** (3.34)*** (4.05)*** (3.79)*** (3.79)*** (3.09)*** 
WTO memberijt 0.112 0.130 0.131 0.133 0.134 0.127 
 (15.74)*** (14.51)*** (14.09)*** (14.91)*** (15.15)*** (10.94)*** 
Log Populationit 0.121 0.146 0.149 0.051 0.044 0.075 
 (0.32) (3.59)*** (1.21) (13.90)*** (18.16)*** (15.05)*** 
Log Populationjt 0.283 0.265 0.253 0.264 0.278 0.276 
 (16.36)*** (12.36)*** (19.16)*** (0.90) (1.11) (1.59) 
Log (Real GDP p/c)it 1.004 0.677 1.076 1.034 0.745 0.717 
 (46.60)*** (32.15)*** (28.07)*** (33.94)*** (30.60)*** (27.86)*** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)jt 0.687 1.001 0.682 0.718 1.031 1.038 
 (34.19)*** (43.61)*** (45.37)*** (45.99)*** (45.93)*** (38.59)*** 
RTAijt 0.279 0.278 0.263 0.285 0.273 0.245 
 (15.76)*** (14.13)*** (13.74)*** (15.36)*** (14.96)*** (11.12)*** 
Country pair fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Observations 112192 97912 87483 102850 102866 69816 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms 
included but suppressed.  
Table 7. IV Panel Estimation 
Dependent variable:  Exports to i 
Host-Participant pairs vs. Others  
 All sample Drop Latin 
American 
Countries 
Drop African 
Countries 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries 
Drop Poor 
Countries outliers 
Lagged dependent variable 0.821 0.817 0.829 0.820 0.821 0.705 
 (202.82)*** (183.40)*** (191.11)*** (193.24)*** (195.31)*** (123.81)*** 
Participantijt 0.073 0.094 0.085 0.086 0.078 0.045 
 (2.90)** (1.99)** (2.12)** (2.19)** (2.02)** (2.88)** 
WTO member 0.016 0.017 0.031 0.015 0.023 0.033 
 (2.29)** (2.25)** (2.12)** (1.13) (1.68)* (2.13)** 
Log Populationit 0.030 0.021 0.029 0.025 0.022 0.021 
 (1.29) (0.83) (1.17) (0.19) (1.65)* (2.16)** 
Log Populationjt 0.176 0.218 0.307 0.345 0.298 0.262 
 (2.78)** (2.91)** (2.20)** (2.02)** (2.93)** (2.78)** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)it 0.303 0.411 0.304 0.312 0.310 0.300 
 (0.21) (0.30) (0.12) (0.55) (0.19) (0.03) 
Log (Real GDP p/c)jt 0.591 0.543 0.524 0.687 0.639 0.518 
 (3.69)*** (3.85)*** (2.28)** (2.92)** (2.70)** (3.12)*** 
RTAijt 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.015 
 (0.07) (0.49) (0.11) (0.06) (0.16) (1.10) 
Country pair fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.68 
Observations 327537 285402 257457 299657 300999 253226 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms 
included but suppressed. Constant terms included        
Table 8. IV Panel Estimation 
Dependent variable: Exports from i 
Host-Participant pairs vs. Others  
 All sample Drop Latin 
American 
Countries 
Drop African 
Countries 
Drop Middle 
Eastern 
Countries 
Drop Poor 
Countries outliers 
Lagged dependent variable 0.193 0.190 0.195 0.191 0.187 0.189 
 (161.72)*** (149.64)*** (145.97)*** (151.81)*** (152.50)*** (129.82)*** 
Participantijt 0.102 0.104 0.111 0.112 0.114 0.113 
 (10.43)*** (8.39)*** (9.83)*** (9.30)*** (9.83)*** (5.41)*** 
WTO member 0.053 0.033 0.061 0.047 0.050 0.072 
 (35.43)*** (32.11)*** (32.22)*** (32.85)*** (38.50)*** (24.84)*** 
Log Populationit 0.059 0.078 0.094 0.086 0.069 0.045 
 (3.14)*** (22.15)*** (38.89)*** (23.92)*** (10.08)*** (27.77)*** 
Log Populationjt 0.537 0.420 0.762 0.483 0.193 0.694 
 (30.08)*** (8.78)*** (4.60)*** (4.22)*** (31.36)*** (1.74)* 
Log (Real GDP p/c)it 0.981 0.645 0.676 1.001 0.664 0.457 
 (92.10)*** (86.88)*** (55.92)*** (89.89)*** (66.35)*** (51.29)*** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)jt 0.651 0.985 1.037 0.668 1.090 0.708 
 (65.52)*** (62.15)*** (88.22)*** (63.42)*** (91.01)*** (35.45)*** 
RTAijt 0.244 0.241 0.218 0.249 0.247 0.145 
 (26.98)*** (23.96)*** (22.25)*** (26.36)*** (27.09)*** (11.65)*** 
Country pair fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.76 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.59 0.28 
Observations 448287 390071 348657 409738 415905 332224 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms 
included but suppressed. Constant terms included        
  
 
TABLE A1. FIFA WORLD CUP: 1950-2006 
Year Host Participants 
1950 Brazil Brazil, Italy, England, Uruguay, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Bolivia, Chile, 
Paraguay, Yugoslavia, India, Mexico, Portugal, United States, France 
1954 Switzerland Switzerland, Uruguay, Brazil, Hungary, Austria, England, West Germany, 
Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Belgium, Mexico, South 
Korea, Scotland 
1958 Sweden Sweden, West Germany, Austria, France, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay 
1962 Chile Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia, England, Soviet Union, 
West Germany, Italy, Hungary, Spain, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Colombia, 
Mexico, Switzerland  
1966 England Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, England, Italy, Portugal, West Germany, 
France, Hungary, Switzerland, Soviet Union, Bulgaria, North Korea, Mexico, 
Spain 
1970 Mexico Brazil, Italy, Germany FR, Uruguay, England, Mexico, Peru,  Soviet Union, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Israel, Morocco, Romania, 
Sweden 
1974 Germany West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Scotland, Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, 
Yugoslavia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Australia, Haiti, Sweden, Zaire 
1978 Argentina Argentina, Germany, Netherlands, Brazil, Italy, Sweden, Mexico, Peru, 
Hungary, Poland, Scotland, Spain, Austria, France, Iran, Tunisia  
1982 Spain Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Germany, England, Austria, Soviet Union, 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, France, Chile, Peru, Algeria, Cameroon, Kuwait, El Salvador, 
Honduras, New Zealand 
1986 Mexico Germany, France, Belgium, Brazil, England, Mexico, Spain, Bulgaria, England, 
Mexico, Spain, Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Morocco, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, 
Soviet Union, Algeria, Canada, Hungary, Iraq, Korea Republic, Northern 
Ireland, Portugal, Scotland 
1990 Italy Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Belgium, England, Austria, Netherlands, 
Scotland, Spain, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, 
Romania, Sweden, Uruguay, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Egypt, South Korea, 
United Arab Emirates, United States 
1994 USA United States, Germany, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Italy, Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Russia, Greece, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Mexico 
1998 France France, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, 
Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Jamaica, Mexico, United 
States, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, England, Norway, 
Scotland, Yugoslavia, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Iran, Japan, South Korea, 
Saudi Arabia 
2002 Korea and Japan Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Italy, France, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Belgium, 
Croatia, Denmark, England, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Turkey, China, Ecuador, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Uruguay, Cameroon, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, United States 
2006 Germany Iran, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Angola, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, 
Tunisia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Argentina, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Australia, Croatia, Czech Republic, England, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Ukraine 
TABLE A2. TESTING INSTRUMENT QUALITY 
First Stage Estimates 
 Table 3 (1) Table 4 (1) Table 7 (1) Table 8 (1) 
 First lag First lag First lag First lag 
Second lag 0.130  0.210  
 (187.20)***  (40.57)***  
Second lag  0.562  0.544 
  (556.27)***  (242.93)*** 
Participantj 0.241 0.066 0.146 0.003 
 (4.76)*** (1.29) (1.02) (0.07) 
WTO member 0.078 0.097 0.065 0.056 
 (4.65)*** (6.44)*** (5.43)*** (1.98)** 
Log Populationi -0.014 0.378 0.233 1.355 
 (0.46) (19.67)*** (0.84) (9.06)*** 
Log Populationj -0.014 0.528 -0.009 0.422 
 (0.48) (13.43)*** (0.05) (19.79)*** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)i -0.085 0.504 -0.222 0.676 
 (4.76)*** (31.64)*** (0.94) (15.58)*** 
Log (Real GDP p/c)j -0.045 0.402 -0.075 0.474 
 (2.77)*** (26.93)*** (1.50) (18.87)*** 
RTA 0.010 0.101 0.073 0.167 
 (0.68) (7.43)*** (0.86) (6.31)*** 
Observations 327537 447334 63589 82236 
R-squared 0.10 0.53 0.19 0.65 
F stat 562.11 7613.15 34.02 2070.77 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Year dummies and constant terms 
included but suppressed. Constant terms included.        
 
